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WHAT CciNSTITUTES REVOCATION WHEN NO METHOD SPE-

By trust deed of 1927, settlor conveyed two mortgages {the first
for $5,200, and the second for $1,000, both given by Harry E. Hough and
wife) to trustees, in trust for herself for life, and providing for certain disposition upon her death. The trust deed was revocable with reserved power in the
settlor to convey, release or otherwise dispose of the property. In 1928 the settlor
released both mortgages but took in lieu thereof one mortgage for $6,200 from
the same mortgagors on the same property. This substitution was effected to
accommodate the mortgagors and no money changed hands. The settlor died
in 1929, and now, twelve years after her death, some disappointed heirs bring
this action, via administrator, to foreclose the mortgage upon the basis that the
trust was revoked by the exchange of mortgages. The trustee intervenes. Held,
for the trustee, on the ground that the substitution of a single mortgage on the
same property for two mortgages on the realty was not equivalent to revocation
of the trust.1 Hoffa v. Hough, (Md. 1943) 30 A. {2d) 761.
CIFIED -

I2

1 The court also indicated it would refuse to foreclose upon the further ground of
years of !aches.
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It is a general rule that if a trust is once completely established, the settler
cannot revoke it unless such power is reserved in its creation.2 Some modern
courts have indicated that the absence of power to revoke a voluntary settlement
or trust is to be viewed as a circumstance of suspicion, and very slight evidence
of mistake, misapprehension, or misunderstanding on the part of the settler will
be laid hold of to set aside the deed. 3 When the trust is created for the sole
benefit of the settior, it seems only logical that he may revoke or amend it, with
or without the consent of the trustee. 4 But if the trust is expressly revocable, it
is usual to provide in the instrument that it may be revoked by following a
specified procedure, which, with minor variants, ordinarily contemplates a
written instrument, signed and acknowledged by the settler and delivered to the
trustee. 5 In the absence of some provision specifying the method of revocation,
revocation may be accomplished by the execution of any instrument intended for
that purpose which sufficiently expresses the intention to revoke; 6 or by any act
or conveyance sufficient to terminate the trust. 7 Just what acts, conveyances,
instruments, or formalities constitute revocation when no special method is out,Iined is a vital and ever-present problem. A subsequent mortgage placed on the
trust property by the settler has been held a revocation; 8 a letter from the settler
to the trustee expressing a desire to revoke, followed by the trustee's formal surrender and execution of new trust deed, revoked the former; 9 a subsequent
declaration of trust containing provisions inconsistent with those contained in
the original declaration acts as revocation; 10 a subsequent will with appropriate
disinheriting sentiments may revoke a tentative bank account trust.11 Courts
which are called upon to judge wh~ther an apparent ambiguous act has revoked
a trust or not should keep in mind just what revocation connotes. "Revoke"
means to annul or make void by recalling or taking back, cancel, rescind, repeal,
2 Eschen v. Steers, (C.C.A. 8th, 1926) IO F. (2d) 739; Price v. Price, 162 Md.
656, 161 A. 2 (1932), trust validly and legally created without power of revocation
cannot thereafter be revoked merely because settlor has undergone a change of heart;
James v. James, 260 Mass. 19, 156 N.E. 745 (1927); Stephens v. Moore, 298 Mo.
215, 249 S.W. 601 (1923), where the court indicated that if consent of all beneficiaries is obtained, settlor might revoke in absence of reserved power; 4 BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 993 (1935).
8 Lambdin v. Dantzebecker, 169 Md. 240, 181 A. 353 (1935).
4 O'Brien v. Holden, 104 Vt. 338, 160 A. 192 (1933).
5 Braga v. Rome Trust Co., 151 Misc. 641, 272 N.Y.S. 101 (1934); 46 YALE
L. J. 1005 (1937).
6 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 330.7 (1939).
7 Broga v. Rome Trust Co., 151 Misc. 641,272 N.Y.S. 101 (1934); 46 YALE
L. J. 1005 (1937); 65 C.J. 347 (1933); 2 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 330, comment
(1935).
8 Gaither v. Williams, 57 Md. 625 (1881).
9 Holbert v. Jackson, 134 Misc: 618, 235 N.Y.S. 642 (1929).
10 Lambdin v. Dantzebecker, 164 Md. 240, 181 A. 353 (1935); Barnard v.
Gantz, 140 N.Y. 249, 35 N.E. 430 (1893), points out that no formal notice of revocation need be delivered to the original trustee.
11 ln re Beck's Estate, 260 App. Div. 651, 23 N.Y.S. (2d) 525 (1941).
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reverse.12 Thus a trust is not revoked by acts or conveyances consistent with its
continued existence,18 for revocation implies cessation and extinguishment of a
trust, and when made operates to put an end to it.14 It is not sufficient to constitute revocation that certain provisions be changed, or even the subject matter
change form, but that the new agreement be clearly inconsistent with the prior
existence of the trust, or the trusteeship after its date.15

Dickson M. Saunders

12 O'Hagen v. Kracke, 165 Misc. 4, 300 N.Y.S. 351 (1937). In analogy to a
will, the word "revoke" with reference to testator's revocation of will necessarily involves change of mind of testator, and inyolves $Orne exercise of testator's will by which
he either expressly recalls his previous disposition of property or from which the law
implies he intended to do so. Pacetti v. Rowlinski, 169 Ga. 602, 150 S.E. 910 (1929).
18 Reel v. Hansboro State Bank, 52 N.D. 182, 201 N.W. 861 (1924); 39 CYc.
95 (1912).
J.4 Warsco v. Oshkosh Savings & Trust Co., 183 Wis. 156, 196 N.W. 829 (1924).
15 Patterson v. Johnson, 113 Ill. 559 (1885). It is not the purpose of this note
to discuss the destruction of trusts by merger of interests, statutes, or destruction of the
trust corpus. See 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, §§ 997, 998, 999 (1935).

